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Foreign Aid Transaction Costs 
 
 
Frieda Vandeninden* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The term ‘transaction cost’ has been widely mentioned in the recent literature on aid effectiveness. In 
fact, the shift into the aid delivery system (see e.g. the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness) has been 
justified among others by the high transaction costs generated by the previous aid modalities. In this 
paper, we first want to understand what the notion of transaction costs means in the context of aid 
delivery and give a typology of the possible costs. We also develop an analytical framework to 
evaluate them. This framework appears to be a relevant tool to compare the effectiveness of aid 
modalities. We finally apply this analytical framework in Mali: we look at the evolution of the foreign 
aid transaction costs in two sectors (health and education) with the introduction of sector-wide 
programmes. 
 
Key words: aid modalities, aid effectiveness, transaction costs 
JEL Codes: O20, O22, D23 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The question of aid effectiveness has led to an important debate over the past 20 years. 
There exists a wide empirical literature about the impact of aid on poverty reduction and 
growth.1 However, there are still no clear-cut conclusions about the relative ineffectiveness of 
aid. Although most of the scholars agree that aid has a weak impact on development, the 
explanation of this ineffectiveness has found no consensus. For a long time, many economists 
claimed that the major causes of the ineffectiveness were the poor institutional capacities and 
the bad policy environment (see e.g. Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
 However, as this hypothesis is a bit too deterministic (because it would imply that aid 
should be given only to recipient with good policies for instance), the International 
Community and some development economists have also questioned the aid modalities. In 
fact, the way aid is delivered could not fit a country’s specific policies and economics 
environment and this could also explain the poor effectiveness. The ‘previous’ delivery 
                                                 
* Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University and Center of Research 
in Public Economics and Population Economics, Université de Liège. Contact at 
Frieda.vandeninden@Maastrichtuniversity.nl  
1 See for instance Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and Easterly et al., 2007. 
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system, represented mainly by project aid, has thus been more and more criticized. The main 
critiques are the following: 
 Lack of coherence between donors policies, but also between donors and recipients, 
 Fragmentation and duplication of developmental projects, 
 The lack of ownership and leadership of the partner countries: the development 
projects are often decided by each donor, without any consultation of the recipient, 
 The donors do not use the national procedures to give aid: there is thus no capacity 
building. 
All these critiques underline problems that have lead to a deep questioning of the aid delivery 
system. In fact, the aid agencies realized recipients bear a high ‘costs’ due to their different 
requirements and approaches to deliver the aid. Moreover, because of the relative 
independence of each donor, there is a duplication of efforts. They consequently also bear a 
‘cost’. This notion of ‘cost’ or ‘transaction cost’ is imprecise, but it is clear that the 
characteristics of the previous system lead to some ‘losses’ on both partners.  
 In early 2000, the International Community agreed that changes would be needed (see 
High-Level Forums on aid effectiveness). The following statement, made by Ministers, Heads 
of Aid Agencies and other Senior Officials of 28 aid recipient countries and more than 40 
multilateral and bilateral development expresses this awareness: ‘We in the donor community 
have been concerned with the growing evidence that, over time, the totality and wide variety 
of donor requirements and processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring development 
assistance are generating unproductive transaction costs for, and drawing down the limited 
capacity of, partner countries. We are also aware of partner country concerns that donors’ 
practices do not always fit well with national development priorities and systems, including 
their budget, programme, and project planning cycles and public expenditure and financial 
management systems. We recognise that these issues require urgent, coordinated, and 
sustained action to improve our effectiveness on the ground’ (Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation in February, 2003). 
The donors consequently agreed upon some new guidelines that are formalized in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The commitment on the donors to the new 
guidelines has also been confirmed in 2008 (see the Accra Agenda for Action). The main 
ideas are: 
 The ownership by the partner countries, 
 The alignment of donors on recipients’ strategies and procedures, 
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 The harmonization between donors’ actions, 
 A mutual accountability,  
 A managing for results. 
 
These new ideas represent an important shift into aid delivery system: the new system, 
also called the programme approach, should outweigh the inefficiencies of the project 
approach. And consequently, the transaction costs are expected to decrease. Let us note that in 
practice, the programme approach can take the form of a sector programme: the donors and 
the recipient decide together on the allocation of aid to a particular sector (e.g. health, 
education). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are another example. According to the 
International Community, this new aid system should enhance the aid effectiveness by 
decreasing the transactions costs. It seems that the link between aid effectiveness and foreign 
aid transaction costs is quite obvious: to enhance the effectiveness, the transaction costs have 
to decrease. However, this notion of transaction cost is rather confuse in the aid literature. 
And even if scholars, aid practitioners often refer to reduction of the transaction costs as an 
important challenge of the programme approach, they do not formally explain what these 
costs are. 
 Consequently, in this paper, we first want to understand the concept of transaction cost 
(part 2). We thus refer to the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to define formally the 
transactions costs in the case of foreign aid. Then, we develop a conceptual framework to 
compare and evaluate the effectiveness of the aid modalities. This framework consists in a 
typology and an evaluation of the foreign aid transaction costs. We indeed want to verify 
whether the new aid delivery system decreases the transaction costs2. Analysing the aid 
modalities with the transaction costs economics should, to a certain extent, allow us to 
identify which modality minimizes these transactions costs. It will thus help us to measure the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. 
 The third part of this work is devoted to a case study: the sector approach in Mali. We 
apply our typology to analyse the evolution of the transaction costs since the introduction of 
two sector-wide programmes: the PRODEC (‘Programme Décennal de Développement de 
l’Education’) and the PRODESS (‘Programme Décennal de Développement Sanitaire et 
                                                 
2 This hypothesis hasn’t been empirically verified. See Killick T., 2004, p. 19 : « The superiority of program aid 
[…] rests on a presumption of the comparative costs of the respective aid modalities, which has not, so far is 
known, been empirically established in any systematic way. » 
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Social’). The question is to see whether the transaction costs have decreased with this 
programme approach.  
We show that the costs do not seem to decrease globally, mainly because of the political, 
technical and institutional constraints. 
 
 
2. The transaction costs: definition and typology 
 
To understand what the transaction costs are in the context of the transaction of foreign aid, 
we refer to the Transactions Costs Economics. Indeed, aid delivery is a transaction: the donors 
transfer some money to a partner country and expect, in exchange, some results (e.g. poverty 
reduction, vaccination campaign, etc.). The TCE is thus a relevant tool to help us understand 
how the costs can be minimized. 
In order to develop an analysis framework, we define and give a typology of the 
possible costs occurring with the aid delivery. This initial stage will allow us to determine the 
weaknesses and strengths of each aid system delivery and to compare them. But first, let 
introduce the main concepts of the TCE. 
 
2.1. The transaction cost Economics 
   
This economic theory has been mainly developed by O. E. Williamson in the 1970’s 
and by D. North in the early 1990’s. The theory aims at finding out the best way to organize a 
transaction of goods or services between two economic agents (Williamson O. E., 1993, 
p.16). The principle is that the structure of governance chosen for the transaction has to 
minimize the transaction costs, taking into account that each transaction differs according to 
its qualities – frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity. The TCE also relies on two main 
hypotheses. These hypotheses explain why the transaction costs occur. 
 
a. Behavioural hypotheses 
 The first hypothesis is the bounded rationality. Economic agents cannot predict 
precisely how the transaction will evolve. It implies that every contract is per se 
incomplete.  
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 The second one is the risk of opportunism. Because of the contract incompleteness, 
there is a risk that the agents involved in the transaction take profit of the imperfect 
distribution of information. 
 
As a consequence of these hypotheses, when a transaction takes place, the agents involved 
bear high costs in order to cope with the contract incompleteness and the risk of opportunism. 
In the context of developing countries, these hypotheses may be interpreted in terms of 
corruption, irrational behaviours (different ministries could accept overlapping projects for 
instance) and difficulty to ensure the link between donors and recipients (unnecessary 
monitoring procedures, conditionality, etc.).  
 
b. Transactions characteristics 
 In order to choose the right structure of governance, we also have to look at the 
characteristics of the transaction. In fact, we have seen that because of the behavioural 
hypothesis, the agents bear some costs in order to protect themselves from the opportunism 
and the contract incompleteness. And depending on the characteristics of each transaction, 
some structures of governance will be preferred. In the TCE, there are three types of 
characteristics. 
 Asset specificity. If the transaction has a high level of asset specificity, the transaction 
concerns non-standard goods that require specific investments that cannot be easily re-
used for other transaction. For example, producing a specific good can require the 
construction of a machine that will only produce this good. If the transaction ends, that 
is if the good is not produced anymore, the investment will be lost. The impact on the 
choice of transactions governance is clear: when asset specificity is high, both parts 
want that the transaction goes to termination; if it does not, the investments in specific 
asset will be lost or devaluated. In the context of aid transfer, the investments in 
specific assets are generally high. On one hand, the recipient government has to make 
some investments to manage the aid transfer (investments in civil servants formation 
among other). On the other hand, the donor government devotes some resources in 
order to ensure itself that the transaction goes well (sending technical assistants, 
monitoring procedure, etc.). 
 Uncertainty. As the information is always incomplete, the agents cannot predict the 
performance of the other agent. This incompleteness of information can take the form 
of moral hazard (one agent cannot assess other agent’s effort) or asymmetry (one 
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agent has more information than the other).3 This lack of transparency makes that the 
principal (the International Community) does not always know how the agent (the 
recipient) allocates the aid. Of course, this uncertainty increases the control costs. 
 Frequency. This point is quite obvious. The more frequently the transaction takes 
place, the more easily the costs are recovered. Both agents will profit from economy 
of scale.  
 
c. Structures of governance 
 Having these two behavioural hypotheses and the three characteristics in mind, we can 
link them and find the structures of governance minimizing the costs. 
 
Figure 1: Foreign aid modalities and governance structures 
 
Source: adaptation of Williamson (1994, p.52) 
 
 Let us take a look at this graph. The transactions taking place on the market concern 
generally non-specific goods. These standard products can be realized easily by a lot of 
agents. It gives to both parts of the transaction a sufficient protection against opportunism (the 
provider can be replaced if he does not respect his engagements). And it is not necessary to 
build an accurate contract that foresees the transaction evolution. 
                                                 
3 We here refer to the principal-agent theory. 
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The opposite structure of governance is the firm. When goods have a very high level 
of asset specificity, both parts of the transaction have to protect themselves against the risk of 
transaction cancellation (this cancellation would imply important “sunk costs” (Williamson, 
1993, p. 16)). And if the uncertainty and or the frequency are very high, it can be preferable to 
internalize the transaction in one economic unit, the firm. But inevitably, this structure of 
governance is very costly to set up and leads to new costs (e.g. management costs).  
 
 The structures of governance called hybrids present both characteristics of the market 
and the firm. In practice, they take the form of all types of contracts. The products involved 
here have a higher level of asset specificity and require thus a contract stipulating the 
transaction expectations (nature of the good, quality, shipping details, etc.). However, the 
characteristics are not such that the firm is better. In fact, for instance, when the frequency is 
not very high, then the costs induced by the internalization of the transaction in a firm are not 
recover easily. It is thus better to set up a contract, still facing some costs, but not bearing the 
new costs induced by the firm (management costs). 
 Applied to the aid transfer context, this graph can be interpreted as follows. Aid 
transfers that are not associated with specific requirements as for the use of funds, and 
therefore do not entail specific management tools (conditionality, reform measures, 
indicators, monitoring processes, etc.) can easily be managed through a market-like 
governance structure; this situation can be assimilated with the balance of payment support. 
However, donors – and governments – often attach a value as to how aid funds are used, and 
are ready to invest in further specific assets (conditionality, experts, monitoring systems, etc.) 
to prevent aid from being misallocated by opportunism. According to transaction cost 
economics, such asset specificity associated to aid entails that non-market governance 
structure are optimal to minimise transaction costs. Following our analytical framework 
outlined in Figure 1, three cases may be encountered. When donors do not specify how aid 
funds should be allocated (so that the recipient government decides on how to use them) and 
therefore do not set up specific “guarantees” system, a hybrid contract appears to minimise 
aid transaction costs. When applied to our purpose, this situation can be assimilated with 
budget support. When donors stipulate how the money should be allocated and frequently 
interact with the government on related matters, the corresponding hybrid structure of 
governance appears to be programme approaches in general, especially the sector-wide 
approach (SWAp). Finally, when donors have such precise requirements regarding the use of 
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aid funds that they prefer to manage them by themselves, they can set up a firm-like 
hierarchical structure in order to control the transaction, under the form of a project. 
The fundamental question addressed in this paper is which modalities minimize the 
transaction costs. But the answer does not seem straightforward. In fact, it depends on the 
different characteristics of the aid transfer, and these latter depend on the specific countries 
context. Even if in theory, we agree that a programme approach will allow division of labour 
and coordination between donors, harmonization of procedures, less duplication of 
developmental efforts, it is not proved formally that the transaction costs will decrease. 
Moreover, we also have to take into account that some new types of costs could emerge with 
a new aid delivery system (e.g. costs of harmonization). To try to answer our question, we 
should thus proceed by case study (see section C for Mali) and review the evolution of each 
costs. The next section thus aims at defining and identifying the foreign aid transaction costs. 
 
 
2.2. Foreign aid transaction costs  
We have seen that each transaction generates some costs. The transaction ‘aid transfer’ also 
does. We first want to identify these costs and then compare the different organizational 
structures. According to the European Commission, the new aid approach (or programme 
approach, based on partnership) should lead to a decrease of the transaction costs (European 
Commission, 2003, p. 14). The conceptual framework we build in the subsequent section 
aims at verifying this hypothesis. More generally, it also allows evaluating and comparing the 
effectiveness of aid delivery systems. We provide an analytical framework to empirically test 
the effectiveness of aid modalities.4 In fact, ‘the superiority of programme aid in this respect 
remains only a hypothesis because it rests on a presumption of the comparative costs of the 
respective aid modalities, which has not, so far as is known, been empirically established in 
any systematic way’ (Killick, T., 2004, p.19). 
 We define the transaction costs of foreign aid as all the costs implied by the aid 
management. According to the European Community, these costs include all the expenditure 
necessary to the transfer of foreign aid. These expenditures have no value for the donor and 
                                                 
4 The framework developed in this section is the author point of view. We refer to the TCE 
and keep the logic of this theory. However, we propose our own typology and indicators, 
which are specific to the case of aid transfer. 
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for the recipient. They only occur to make the aid transfer possible (European Commission, 
2003, p. 14). 
 Before giving a typology of these costs, we would make some preliminary remarks. 
The definition given by the T.C.E. does not totally satisfy us. It misses the fact that these costs 
are not always ‘lost’ in the transaction. Some can generate value added. They can be induced 
by activities with positive externalities (for example, coordination meetings improve the 
relations between both parts, etc.). We will thus distinguish ‘pure’ transaction costs from 
‘investment in harmonization’ costs. Moreover, it is not useless to mention that all the costs 
are not financial. Most of the transaction costs are opportunity costs and have to be interpreted 
in terms of loss of time, bad exploitation of human resources, etc. 
 
 We can now expose the typology of the costs, based on the following criteria. For a 
case study, we have to look at these criteria to understand the problem. This will allow us to 
evaluate the costs, and as a consequence, to identify the most appropriate structure of 
governance, or aid modality. 
 
Classification criteria: 
 Timing of the costs. They can be shared in three periods: ex ante, ex post, but also 
during the transaction. In fact, ‘transaction costs occur at all stages of the aid 
management cycle, from the initial negotiation of aid through to disbursement, 
implementation (including procurement, construction, etc), and monitoring of the 
activities it finances’ (European Commission, 2007, p.27). 
 Agency costs. These come from the asymmetry of information. According to the 
Principal-Agent Theory, a principal (here the donors) delegate a task (the realization 
of a project or developmental programme) to the agent (the recipient). The recipient 
has more information (on the institutional context for instance) than the principal. 
Moreover, the principal cannot observe the agent’s effort (non-measurable outputs for 
instance). These two informational problems, respectively adverse selection and moral 
hazard, can lead to some costs (additional monitoring procedures, funds distortions, 
etc.). 
 Investment in harmonization costs. Some expenditure (e.g. cost of coordination) can 
have positive effects on the transaction. Indeed, ‘transaction costs are not a pure 
efficiency loss: the same activities that embody transaction costs may also have 
positive benefits (e.g. learning from working groups, mitigating risks through 
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fiduciary safeguards)’ (European Commission, 2007, p.27). We therefore have to 
consider a specific category for this type of costs. 
 Fixed costs vs. variable costs. The fixed costs occur in the transition between two 
modalities. Variable costs are the other routine costs. It is important to distinguish 
them because an evaluation of the transaction costs during the implementation of a 
sector-wide approach for instance will probably show an increase in the costs, but 
these are fixed costs and appears only because of the transition between two aid 
instruments.  
 Opportunity costs. We want to stress the fact that in the case of the foreign aid 
transaction, the costs are mainly non-financial. We then take into account all the 
opportunity costs (loss of time, human resources, etc.). 
 Who bears the costs? If the recipient bears the majority of the costs, it will evidently 
impede the aid effectiveness. Besides, when the donors bear high cost, the total aid 
available is decreased by this burden. It is thus important that both costs decrease. 
 
In what follows, we identify the major transaction costs occurring with the aid 
disbursement and we assign some indicators to measure each of them (see Annex 1). 
A quantitative analysis of transaction costs will then be possible within this 
framework.5  
 
Ex ante costs 
These costs occur before the aid transfer. We indentify two costs: 
 The identification costs: they are related to all the preliminary reports done before the 
implementation of a project/programme. They can include the evaluation of the cost of 
the project, an analysis of the objectives, etc., 
 The formulation costs: these are related to the planning of the project/programme. 
 
The costs during the transaction 
 The costs of investment: these are beard by the donors and are necessary for the 
execution of the project/programme (e.g. rent of offices in the partner country), 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, during our research in Mali, we realized some indicators were really difficult 
to measure and required information hard to get. 
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 The costs of administration and management (e.g. the remuneration of the director of 
the project). 
 
Ex post costs 
 The costs of follow up, 
 The costs of financial control and extern audit, 
 The impact evaluation. 
 
The agency costs 
 The cost of ownership: they are related to the lack of confidence between the donors 
and the recipient’s institutions (e.g. unnecessary monitoring measures), 
 The costs of coherence: they include all the costs related to projects/programmes that 
are not in the national priorities of the partner country. 
 
The investment in harmonization costs 
The implementation of a programme approach lead to some new costs that did not exists with 
a project approach. We consider these costs as an investment since they will have some 
positive effect in the long run on the donors-recipient relationship. 
 The harmonization costs: these costs occur when the donors work together to 
harmonize their procedures, 
 The coordination costs: they are related to the effort of the donors and the recipients to 
work together within a same sector or programme. 
 
To assess the effectiveness of the aid modalities, one has to look at all the resources ‘wasted’ 
to deliver the aid. Evidently, the aid effectiveness depends strongly on the minimization of 
these costs. However, we should also stress the fact that some costs, are not pure transaction 
costs. This is the case of the investment in harmonization costs. These costs have a positive 
impact on the aid transaction. Therefore, the choice of aid modalities depends on the 
transaction costs and also the investment in harmonization costs. More precisely, a modality 
will be preferred to another one when the decrease in transaction costs from modality 1 to 
modality 2 (a programme approach) is higher than the investment cost induced by the 
modality 2. In fact, if the saving on the transaction costs is small and the investment costs of a 
programme approach are high, then the change in aid modality is not worthwhile. In other 
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words, it is more effective to adopt modality 2 if TC1  TC2  IC2 . And in order to measure 
the transaction costs, we set up a list of indicators for each of them (see appendix 1). This will 
allow us, to a certain extent, to quantify the transaction costs. Let see in practice, how we can 
apply this analytical framework. 
 
 
3. APPLICATION: THE CASE OF MALI 
 
 We apply this framework to the case of Mali. The quantitative data to measure the 
foreign aid transaction costs (see appendix 1) are not easy to collect.6 We therefore add a 
qualitative survey in order to bring the most accurate answers to our research question “Does 
the Sector Programme allow reducing foreign aid transaction costs, compared to Project 
Aid?”. We sent the survey to the stakeholders of donors’ agency in Mali and to civil servants 
in charge of the sector wide approach. The questionnaire is divided in two parts. First, there 
are some general questions about the transaction costs. This allows us to understand better the 
transaction cost concept and also to realize that this concept was often misused. The second 
part of the questionnaire aims at evaluating the evolution of the transaction costs since the 
introduction of sector wide approach.7 For this last part, we developed two different 
questionnaires: one for the donors’ stakeholders and one for the partner countries’ 
stakeholders.8  
 We chose the case of Mali because two sector wide programmes have been 
implemented in 2000 and 1998 respectively: the PRODEC (‘Programme Décennal de 
Développement de l’Education’) and the PRODESS (‘Programme Décennal de 
Développement Sanitaire et Social’). There are both quite representative of the programme 
approach. 
                                                 
6 We stayed only 3 weeks in Mali and get the data only from two donors’ agencies (Belgium 
and Germany) and some punctual data from the ministry of health and education. We cannot 
thus quantify entirely the transaction costs for these sectors. 
7 The interviews have been conducted in 2005. 
8 In the qualitative questionnaires, we ask to each stakeholders their opinion about the 
evolution of each transaction costs. They are available on demand (see author’s contact 
information). 
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 As claimed by the International Community and many donors, the new aid paradigm 
should increase aid effectiveness by the reduction of transaction costs. We therefore look at 
whether these two sector wide programmes reduce foreign aid transaction costs in Mali. 
 Before answering this question, we should add some remarks about the difficulties to 
set up a sector wide approach. As said in the previous section, the aid modality that minimizes 
the transaction costs depends on the transaction’s characteristics and then on the specific 
country context. And in Mali, there are some constraints that hindered the implementation of 
this aid modality. We identify three types of constraints: political, institutional and technical.  
 Political constraints, because donors often want their contribution to be visible and 
identifiable. However, when giving aid by the means of Sector-wide Programmes, the 
contribution of each donor is not as straightforward as with Project Aid. Moreover, it 
is not easy to find a consensus among the donors over the developmental strategy for 
the sector. They also do not always agree on the disbursement procedures. 
 Institutional constraints: according to many technical and financial partners, there is a 
huge lack of national human resources, as much in terms of quantity as in terms of 
quality. The weight of politics on nominations (in ministries) being high, there is a 
constant roll within the civil servants occupations. That roll prevents nationals from 
capitalizing the knowledge and the know-how.  
 Technical constraints, because Sector Approach (especially its implementation) 
requires a lot of meetings between the donors and the civil servants. Those later have 
thus less time to achieve management and administration tasks. Let us note that this 
constraint generates the so-called fixed costs. 
 
 This analysis of transaction costs is thus entirely based on our interpretation of the data 
we collected in Mali. We gather the opinion of about 20 stakeholders in the health and 
education sectors and some punctual data on the indicators (such as the number of meetings 
of coordination, number of evaluation report, technical assistants, etc.). We cannot quantify 
entirely the transaction costs with our survey, but it clearly can give an indication on their 
evolution. Let us remind that we keep a comparative logic: how does the sector wide 
approach (S.A.) costs evolve compared to P.A. (project approach) costs? In what follows, we 
review the evolution of each transaction costs identified in the previous section. 
 
3.1. Evolution of each costs 
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I. Ex-ante costs evolution 
 
Identification costs 
 These costs globally decrease for donors, because there is a sector programme 
defining actions to undertake. Each donor does not have to undertake separated studies to 
identify cases in which to intervene or macroeconomic survey for instance. On the other part, 
recipient’s stakeholders are more implied in the identification process than with a Project 
Approach. There are thus new costs that appear on the recipient with the S.A.. However, it 
seems that the economies of scale on the donors’ side compensate this costs increase and the 
recipient’s side so that they globally decrease. In theory, they should keep on decreasing. 
 
Formulation costs 
 With the S.A. in Mali, each donor still uses a different way of financing so that 
formulation costs stay important. This is one of the major obstacles of the transaction cost 
decrease: as donors do not harmonize their financial instruments, the partner country still 
faces multiple procedures and still bears high transaction costs. Note that we can expect that 
these costs will decrease with time (for instance, within the PRODEC, the Canada, the 
Netherlands and the World Bank use the same procedure of disbursement, via a pooling 
fund).  Theoretically, S.A. should reduce the formulation costs when the harmonization will 
be more effective. 
 
 
II. Costs during the process 
 
Investment costs 
 There is not a real evolution of the investment costs from P.A. to S.A.. In both cases, 
there is a follow-up from day to day, technical assistants in charge of the programme, etc. 
According to the donors’ stakeholders, they still face the same costs as before. But these costs 
should decrease when the donors will have more confidence in institutional capacities (see 
institutional constraint).  
  
Administration and management costs 
 For the financial partners, these costs do not really evolve, because each donor has its 
own requirements and the administration and management of the sector wide programme are 
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similar to the ones of a project. In other term, because there is not a real harmonization 
between the donors, these costs remain the same. We could just note a small decrease for 
some donors who use pooling fund (e.g. Canada and Netherlands in education). However, 
everyone agree that these costs will decrease when the procedures will be harmonized (large 
decrease for donors because of labour division and small increase for recipient). On the 
recipient side, the costs of management and administration have increased since the 
implementation of the programmes requires a strong implication of the recipient’s 
stakeholders (not as in a project approach). And these latter often complain that they face 
additional and new tasks for the same quantity of staff and financial compensation. Therefore, 
these costs have globally (for donors and recipient) increased. 
 
 
III. Ex-post costs evolution 
 
Follow-up and financial control costs 
 With the implementation of a programme approach, these costs should fall. However, 
we found no evolution so far since each donor uses a different financial control, requires a 
follow-up and does not use systematically evaluation reports from national authorities (judged 
often too weak by the donors’ stakeholders). 
 
Evaluation costs 
 Compared to P.A., the evaluation costs decrease slightly. Normally, there is only one 
evaluation report for the whole programme. But some donors continue to demand parallel 
reports in order to determinate their own real impact. This undermines the potential high 
decrease of those costs. 
 
IV. Agency costs evolution 
 
Incoherence costs 
 The major cost decrease implied by S.A. takes place here. The coherence between 
actions made in one sector (health or education) is real. The donors do not undertake two 
identical projects in the same region for instance. There is thus less duplication of efforts. 
 
Delegation costs 
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 These costs do not exist with P.A. since the government role is quasi inexistent. In a 
S.A., they are really important, at least for now, because the institutional capacities are not 
seen as efficient enough. National’s civil servants sometimes lack experience, skills and the 
important turnover in the ministries hinders the capitalization of knowledge. Consequently, 
donors are not very confident in recipient’s institutions and they maintain technical assistants 
in the ministries and require a close follow-up and numerous evaluation reports. This 
delegation increases the risk of funds misuse and thus the costs to prevent that misuse. Once 
the institutional capacities will be judged strong enough, these costs will decrease sharply.  
 
We recapitulate the evolution of the different costs in the following table: 
 Evolution 
from P.A. to 
S.A. 
Comments 
S.A. in theory 
Ex-ante 
Identification 
 
Slight decrease 
because decrease for 
donors but new costs 
for recipients 
weak 
Formulation none 
Decrease if 
political constraint 
disappears 
weak 
 
 
During the 
process 
Investment none 
Decrease if 
institutional 
constraint 
disappears 
weak 
Administration and 
management 
 No evolution for 
donors but 
increases for 
recipient 
middle  
(borne mainly by 
recipient) 
Ex-post 
Follow-up and financial 
control 
none 
Decrease if 
institutional/politic-
al constraint 
disappear 
weak 
Evaluation  
Decrease more if 
political constraint 
disappears 
weak 
Agency costs 
Incoherence  Major effective 
reduction  
weak 
Delegation to recipient 
 Decrease if 
institutional 
constraint 
disappears 
weak 
 
From this table, we see that the evolution of the transaction costs is quite ambiguous. Two 
costs increase sharply (new administration costs for the recipient and news cost from the 
delegation) and only three costs decrease slightly (because of the constraints).  
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Before trying to advance any conclusions, we should look at the different criteria that 
we pointed out in the first part of the paper. In fact, since the aid transaction has a high 
frequency, we have to take into account that fixed costs will be recovered easily and decrease 
in time. Then, if the increase in transaction costs is only due to the fixed costs, it is still 
worthwhile to adopt the new aid modality. These costs are indeed occurring once, during the 
implementation of a new modality. Moreover, it is important to consider that the 
implementation of a programme approach require some investments (in harmonization and 
coordination). 
 
V. Fixed and variable costs evolution 
 All the costs described above are either fixed or variable. The first ones are due to the 
P.A.-S.A. transition. The second ones are implied by the aid transfer in general. The fixed 
costs are initially high, but are going to decrease quickly in time. It is thus important to 
distinguish them. 
We identify two major fixed costs. The identification costs have decreased but only 
slightly, however, the set up of the programme requires lot of time, meeting (usually more 
than with a project). Evidently, since it was the first time that sector programmes have been 
implemented in the education and health sector, we expect that with time these costs will keep 
on decreasing. The second fixed costs are the management costs. In fact, when adopting new 
procedures, a period of adaptation is necessary for both donors and recipients. The donors are 
now implied in the programme administration while the donors still bear the same costs as 
with a project approach. We can expect that these costs will decrease once everyone get used 
to this new way of ‘working’ (and also if the donors trust the institutional capacities of the 
recipients, see institutional constraint). Note that in the long run, these costs are supposed to 
be beard mainly by the recipient (this reflect the ownership of the programme).  
 
 
VI. Investment in harmonization costs 
 
Harmonization costs 
 These costs do not exist with a P.A., because each donor sets up his own project by 
himself. With a sector-wide approach, these costs are expected to be high. However, in Mali, 
the harmonization is not on the agenda. Donors are not yet ready to unify their procedures and 
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requirements. This, in turn, hinders the decrease of some of the transaction costs mentioned 
above. 
 
Coordination costs 
 The major cost difference between P.A. and S.A. resides here. The implementation of 
a S.A. requires a lot of coordination meetings. These meetings consume many resources 
(financial, human and in time). Again, these meetings should be less frequent when the 
donors delegate the management tasks to the nationals’ stakeholders (no more institutional 
constraint). 
 Let us remain that these costs occur with a programme approach. But they are 
generated by activities that create positive repercussions in the long run. Let us note some 
examples. The coordination meetings allow to improve the information and to strengthen the 
confidence between partners. The recipient leadership allows nationals to capitalize 
knowledge and know-how. There are important positive externalities that have to be taken 
into account in the long run.  
 
 
3.2. Evolution of the transaction costs in Mali 
 
 We wanted to answer this question: Does the sector wide approach reduce foreign 
aid transaction costs, compared to project approach? More specifically we verified the 
assumption that a programme approach reduces foreign aid transaction costs, compared 
to project approach. 
 According to our 2005 survey, the situation in Mali does not verify this hypothesis. In 
fact, as seen above, the evolution of the transaction costs since the implementation of the 
sector-wide programmes is not clear: two costs increase while three of them decrease slightly 
and the others remain constant. Consequently we cannot conclude that the transaction costs 
have decreased. On the other side, the investment costs have increased but not as expected 
(because there is no harmonization of the procedures). Thus, two questions remain: What 
does explain this ambiguous evolution? And, is it worthwhile to implement a programme? 
 As explained above, the evaluation of the foreign aid transaction costs has to take into 
account the high frequency of the aid delivery. There are some fixed costs but we should not 
worry too much about these because they will disappear once the new ‘way of working’ is 
well established. In fact, aid delivery is a transaction that will take place regularly in the 
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future, and these costs will be recovered easily. The increase of the fixed costs is thus a 
normal phenomenon. We should therefore look at all the other ‘routine’ costs. However, these 
latter do not show any positive evolution. In fact, the costs of evaluation and incoherence 
decrease whereas the costs of delegation increase and the costs of formulation, investment and 
financial control do not evolve. The main concern is thus not the fixed costs but rather the 
different constraints that impede the reduction of the routine costs. In fact, as said above, the 
evolution of the transaction costs depends strongly of the specific context. And in Mali, there 
are the political, institutional and technical constraints that hinder the reduction of the costs. 
 The technical constraint creates the fixed costs, so that our focus should be on the 
political and institutional constraints. The fact that some donors are still reluctant to a 
programme approach has many consequences. Donors’ agencies for instance often maintain 
some specific evaluation reports or do not want to use pooling funds. They want their 
contribution to be visible (for political reasons).  This hinders the diminution of the costs of 
investment, evaluation and financial control. Note also that the fact that donors do not always 
agree on the priorities and the policies to adopt in the sector has had some repercussions on 
the costs of identification (the decrease could also be stronger for those costs). Finally, the 
political constraint represents also the problem of harmonization of donors’ procedures. More 
specifically, donors still use different disbursement procedures for the aid delivery and this is 
a heavy burden for the recipient. The costs of formulation are thus the same as with a project 
approach.  
In addition, the institutional constraint undermines the transaction costs evolution. The 
donors do not really trust the institutional capacities of the recipient and consequently do not 
delegate, as they should in a programme approach, the administration and management tasks 
to the national administration. There is thus an increase in these costs since donors maintain 
the same management procedures than with a project. Also, the costs of investment do not 
change. In practice, the costs during the aid delivery are thus not decreasing with the sector 
approach: the donors still use their own management procedure (because of the political 
constraint) and do not delegate to the recipient. However, since the recipient is now more 
involved in the sector policy, it now faces more management costs than with the project 
approach (e.g. monthly meeting with donors). Another consequence of the institutional 
constraint is that donors do not always use financial report made by the recipient (judge too 
weak) and still conduct parallel control. Finally, the costs of delegation have also increased 
because of this constraint: the donors increase the costs to prevent the fund misuse (there were 
inexistent with P.A. since they fully control the funds in that case). 
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We should also look at the investment in harmonization. These costs, which appear 
with a programme approach, are not really high in Mali. In fact, the donors have not 
harmonized their disbursement procedures and still have specific requirements (because of the 
political constraint). On the other side, there is an effort of coordination between donors and 
the recipient’s stakeholder, which generates some new costs (e.g. numerous meetings). As 
said above, these costs have a value added for the donors-recipients relationship and are at the 
core of a programme approach: new efforts are made and those will have some positive 
repercussions. However, the fact that the harmonization is not on the agenda hinders the 
reduction of some transaction costs (e.g. formulation costs). It also reflects the fact that the 
sector-wide approach in Mali is hybrid.  
Consequently, is the implementation of the sector-wide approach worthwhile? We said 
in the first part that the change in aid modality is valuable if the increase in the investment in 
harmonization costs is smaller than the decrease in the transaction costs. However, in our case 
study, the decrease in transaction costs in not effective, because of the constraints. Also, the 
costs from the investment in harmonization are not very high, since the harmonization is weak 
(also because of the political constraint). Therefore, the potential decrease of the costs does 
not occur, since we have a hybrid form of a sector-wide approach. In fact, when the core 
principles of a programme approach, such as harmonization and ownership, as not respected, 
the potential of this modality is lost.  
 In this situation, the main questions become: is it possible to overcome the current 
constraints? Are the different stakeholders ready to implement a programme approach? If not, 
and even if everyone agrees on the principle underlying the new aid paradigm, the 
implementation of a programme approach is not as effective as it is supposed to be. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This last decade, the new aid paradigm that includes sector wide approach has been 
seen as a very promising tool to enhance aid effectiveness. It is considered as an answer to the 
project approach failures. The programme approach, and in particular, the sector wide 
approach, is a new way to think the relationship between donors and recipients. It is also 
supposed to reduce the transaction costs as it implies a harmonization of procedures, less 
duplication of efforts, the ownership of the recipients and a better prioritization.  
 We first wanted to understand better the concept of transaction costs, as there is no 
formal definition. We then define the foreign aid transaction costs and identify the major 
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costs. Moreover, we set up a methodology to evaluate them. In the last part of the paper, we 
apply this analysis framework in Mali (based mainly on a qualitative survey from 2005). We 
wanted to verify whether a programme approach does reduce the transaction costs, compared 
to a project approach. 
 Since we had a restricted access to the data on the indicators, we developed also a 
qualitative questionnaire. It is divided in two parts: the first one is devoted to the transaction 
costs definition and the second one to the perception of these costs evolution. We see that the 
predicted decrease of the transaction costs does not occur in Mali. This is because the sector-
wide approach in Mali has a hybrid form: some core principles, such as harmonization and 
ownership, are not respected. The main causes are the political and institutional constraints. 
The main question is thus to know when and whether these constraints are going to disappear. 
If not, the potential decrease of the costs is quite doubtful.  
The claim that programme approach allows a reduction of the transaction costs should 
thus be considered carefully. In fact, as this concept is not clear in the aid literature, it is easy 
to make such hypothesis. But when analysing formally the foreign aid transaction, and using 
the Transaction Costs Economics, one sees that this concept is complex. We cannot conclude 
that a particular aid modality minimizes the transaction costs without taking into account the 
countries contexts and the specific transaction characteristics. As we have seen in Mali, it has 
a huge impact on the costs evolution.  
Finally, this paper shows how it is important to evaluate the foreign aid transaction 
costs to assess the aid effectiveness and compare aid modalities. In fact, the impact of aid 
evidently matters, but also the resources wasted to achieve a given impact. The transaction 
costs give us another part of the picture. Future researches should be dedicated to collect data 
on the transaction costs and measure them.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
Transaction costs Costs indicators 
Information and identification 
- Total time devoted to this activity 
  - Staff quantity devoted to this activity 
- Total time in individuals per month, distinguishing managers from 
administrative staff 
- Cost (remuneration amount) 
- Staff quantity sent to recipient country 
- Number of missions and staff quantity per mission 
- Remuneration 
- Number of meetings bound to this activity 
- Costs bound to these meetings (travelling, housing, etc.) 
- Number of meetings with nationals and/or technical and financial partners 
 coordination meetings
- Costs bound to these meetings (travelling, housing, etc.) 
Formulation 
     - Total time devoted to this activity 
- Staff quantity devoted to the identification document revision  
- Total remuneration 
- Number of missions 
- Number of meetings with nationals 
- Time devoted to these meetings 
- Financial cost 
 - Other financial costs (travelling, housing, etc.) 
- Costs bound to negotiation in case of disagreement about identification 
report    
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Transaction costs Costs indicators 
- Number of conditions required by technical and financial partners 
- Number of negotiation meetings about these conditions 
Harmonisation 
 
- Time devoted to harmonisation of donor’s procedures and aims 
- Number of meetings between technical and financial partners 
- Number and amount of projects financed by pooling funds 
- Number of consulting missions 
- Costs of these missions (remuneration per individual and per month and 
investment in car, office, etc.) 
 
 
Costs during the transaction 
 
Investments costs (donors’ 
expenditure) 
- Furniture investments amount 
- Number of technical experts 
- Remuneration 
Costs of project 
administration and 
management 
- Financial cost of project current management 
- Time devoted by experts to this task 
- Number of specific management procedures 
- Staff quantity devoted to this activity 
 
Coordination costs 
- Number (frequency) of meetings between donors and total time 
- Financial cost 
- Other costs of meetings (travelling, housing, etc.) 
- Number of meetings between donors and nationals 
- Costs of meetings 
- Experts’ missions (fees, travelling, housing, etc.) 
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Ex post costs 
 
Follow-up 
- Financial cost of the accountancy system 
- Total time (individuals-month) devoted to this activity 
- Remuneration 
- Number of specific evaluation reports made by the donors 
- Number of reports made by another donor in coordination with several 
donors 
 
 
Financial control 
 
- Number of specific evaluation reports made by donors 
- Number of common reports for several donors 
Extern audit - Cost 
 
Impact evaluation 
 
 
 
- Staff quantity devoted to this task 
- Remuneration 
- Use of common indicators for several donors 
- Number of evaluation missions 
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Agency costs 
 
 
 
Costs linked to the 
appropriation of some 
tasks by nationals 
 
- Staff and other resources devoted by donors to substitution expertise 
- Time devoted by national managers to negotiation and dialogue activities 
instead of planning and management activities 
- Individuals and months of experts devoted to a task normally achieved by 
the government 
- Time ratio between a task achieved by nationals and the same task 
achieved by a donor 
- Number and nature of conditions required by donors 
- Time devoted by civil servants to formations and seminaries 
- Costs of the administrative control required by donors 
 
Costs linked to 
coherence 
 
- Number of projects with specific procedure (not using national 
procedures and systems)  
- Number of projects financed by pooling funds 
- Number of projects that do not fit in the global strategic framework 
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